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Abstract	  
	  
This	  article	  analyses	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  labor	  market	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  state-­‐controlled	  
economy	   towards	   a	   market	   economy.	   We	   consider	   a	   dynamic	   matching-­‐model	   with	   a	  
declining	   and	   an	   emerging	   competitive	   sector.	   We	   show	   that	   there	   are	   two	   opposite	  
strategies	  in	  the	  move	  towards	  a	  market	  economy:	  a	  massive	  decrease	  in	  employment	  or	  a	  
small	  decrease	  in	  employment	  in	  the	  non-­‐competitive	  sector.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  transition	  is	  
achieved	  faster	  with	  a	  big	  reduction	  in	  state	  employment	  than	  with	  a	  small	  one.	  Surprisingly,	  
the	  end	  of	  transition	  is	  also	  characterized	  by	  lower	  unemployment	  when	  there	  are	  massive	  
layoffs	  -­‐	  because	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  the	  high	  unemployment	  implied	  by	  the	  massive	  decrease	  
makes	   job	   creation	   in	   the	   competitive	   sector	  more	   profitable.	   In	   fact,	   this	   seems	   to	   have	  
been	  the	  way	  chosen	  by	  most	  of	  the	  CEECs.	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1 Introduction
Two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the tran-
sition towards a market economy, it is time to take stock of the process.
Recently published papers document a diverging path, and outcome, for
transition amongst the group of post-communist countries. According to
Berglöf et al. (2010) the new EU member states have now more in com-
mon with other EU countries than with the other post-communist countries,
even if important transition challenges remain in some sectors. On the other
hand, most countries in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus,
and South-Eastern Europe (Former Soviet Unions) still face challenges that
distinguish them from other countries at comparable income levels. Hence,
the question the scholars should address now is why some countries have
failed to catch up. Integration into the EU and possession of resources are
only partial explanations (EBRD 2009). With regard to the labor market,
the transition towards a decentralized economy implies dramatic changes.
Most transition countries experience persistant unemployment after the be-
ginning of the reform process. But there are diﬀerences across countries. As
noticed by Lehmann & Muravyev (2011), the Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs) have falling employment rates, growing unemployment
and some decline in real wages. Whereas the Former Soviet Unions (FSUs)
show a limited rise in unemployment, falls in employment and a sharp decline
in real wages. Furthermore these diﬀerences have been increasing in recent
years. We think that the mechanisms underpinning these changes may be
responsible in part for the diverging transformation paths. The purpose of
this paper is to shed light on the process of reallocating jobs and workers
during the process of transition towards a market economy, in order to ex-
plain the variability in the performance of transition countries.
A growing literature suggests that the labor market institutions aﬀect
the performances of the labor market for developed countries, as well as
for transition countries (Lehmann & Muravyev 2011) In particular, Boeri &
Macis (2010) showed that unemployment beneﬁts can improve the quality of
job reallocation through an improvement of the quality of job matches. But
the main prediction of general equilibrium models of the labor market is that
higher unemployment beneﬁts decrease the job search intensity and increase
the reservation wage of job seekers. This results in a higher unemployment
rate and a longer duration of unemployment. Hence, according to Garibaldi
& Brixiova (1998) and Boeri & Terrell (2002), the divergent paths between
CEECs and FSUs can be explained by diﬀerences in non-employment ben-
eﬁts (unemployment beneﬁts, active labor market programs, welfare assis-
tance, disability beneﬁts and sickness beneﬁts). These non-employment ben-
eﬁts are higher in CEECs which causes a lower wage ﬂexibility than in FSUs.
According to these authors, this explains the higher level of unemployment
in the CEECs compared to the FSUs. Yet, following this analysis, we would
expect the transition to be faster and more successful in the FSUs than in
the CEECs, as the labor market institutions are less restrictive. But this
is clearly not what the empirical observations show. Lehmann & Muravyev
(2011) also conclude that their study leaves untouched several important
issues that might have big impacts on labor market dynamics, such as the
development of the informal sector. If the labor market institutions are more
deregulated in the FSUs than in the CEECs, then it is diﬃcult to understand
why the informal sector developed more in these countries. The argument
for labor market institutions seems therefore not completely convincing.
In her literature review, Ferragina & Pastore (2008) states that if typ-
ical neo-classical models explain why diﬀerences can be persistent, the job
reallocation models particularly as adaped to the context of post-communist
countries -the so-called ’Optimal Speed of Transition (OST) models’,- allow
us to understand the emergence of diversity. We therefore use this frame-
work in order to discuss why some countries fall into the ’low reform trap’
depending on how State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) coped with the severe
budget constraint at the beginning of the transformation process. OST mod-
els study the link between job losses in the old ineﬃcient state sector and job
creation in the new more eﬃcient private sector (for a survey of these mod-
els, see Roland 2000). Two schools of thought developed (Godoy & Stiglitz
2006). The ﬁrst advocated that the faster a transition country become a
market economy, the better oﬀ the population would be. The second school
proposed a more gradual process of reform. Hence, in the seminal paper of
Aghion & Blanchard (1994), the government has to select the rate at which
the old sector will be destroyed knowing that if it goes too slowly there will
be a low unemployment rate which will put upward pressure on wages and
hence slow down the growth of the emerging sector. On the other hand if the
old sector is destructed too rapidly, it will create high unemployment which
will reduce net wage increases. OST models suggest that there is a trade-oﬀ
between the speed of job destruction in the old sector and the level of unem-
ployment, and advocate a gradual phasing out of the state sector. Hence, as
explained by Lehmann & Walsh (1999) the restructuring process should be
slowed down so that the new eﬃcient sector can absorb the existing pool of
unemployed. Castanheira & Roland (2000) add that a slow speed of closure
in the old sector does not lead to lower job creation as long as the wages
in this sector are kept low. (State workers will leave for the new private
sector even if the rate of job losses in the old sector is too low). Caballero &
Hammour (1996) model support the notion of gradualism but diﬀer in their
policy implications from traditional OST models. They consider that there
is a cost to job creation that aﬀects the level and the timing of reallocation.
Hence they advocate job creation incentives in the emergent sector. Jurajda
& Terrell (2008) contrast early transition policies and outcomes in Estonia
and the Czech Republic in light of the theoretical prediction of OST and
Caballero & Hammour (1996). They conﬁrm the result of Castanheira &
Roland (2000). They show also that the Czech support was very eﬀective in
dealing with problems.
However, these papers do not explain the persistance of high unemploy-
ment in most of the transition countries. They do not consider the direct
ﬂows from public to private jobs, in which 70 percent of new hires are ﬁlled
by state workers (Boeri 1997, Blanchard 1997). These direct job-to-job ﬂows
could though be responsible for the persistent unemployment with a grow-
ing private sector. With a theoretical labor reallocation model, Tichit (2006)
showed that how SOEs adjust to the new paradigm is a crucial factor of new
private sector development. Faggio (2007) provide an empirical test on the
determinants of job creation, job destruction and unemployment in ten tran-
sition countries. Among other issues, she concludes that job destruction in
the public sector depends on the type of reform of the SOEs, and that the
changes in unemployment levels in the 2000’s were inﬂuenced by what hap-
pened in the 1990’s. Following these papers and contrary to Godoy & Stiglitz
(2006), we believe that the gap between the CEECs and the FSUs can well
come from the initial reforms of SOEs. Therefore we analyze the process
of transition through labor reallocation. We propose a dynamic matching
model in which there are job-to-job ﬂows. We show that countries face two
strategies to achieve their transition: massive or small decrease of state em-
ployment. The strategy determines the evolution of labor markets, and hence
the success or failure of the transition process. We consider macroeconomic
reallocation ﬂows, and not just for one sector as is typical in much of this
literature. We concentrate not only on early transition but we also assess
the transition process two decades after it started.
The ﬁrst section presents the framework. The second section describes
the equilibria according to the diﬀerent strategies adopted by the SOEs. The
third section discusses the dynamics leading to these equilibria. The fourth
section proposes simulations of the dynamics and hence an assessment of
the length of the transition process. The last section synthesizes the main
results and oﬀers some policy implications.
2 The model
The labor force (N) is constant and normalized to 1. We denote by S
employment in the state sector, P employment in the private sector, and U
unemployment. The transition process is modeled as the transition from a
total public production (S = 1 and P = 0) to a total private production (S =
0 and U + P = 1). Hence, transition is the path bewteen these two states.
Figure 1: Flows on the labour market
The closure of public production cannot be immediate, and is planned over
time. We assume that a fraction of public activity is destroyed each period,
generating a job-loss rate δs per period. There is no new hiring in the state
sector as it will be completely destroyed at the end of the transition process.
The decline in the state sector leads to the emergence of unemployment.
Workers can decide to leave this sector to work in the new private sector (on-
the-job search). The growth of the private sector depends on the proﬁtability
of job creation. Private ﬁrms hire unemployed workers as well as public
workers. There is a risk of being dismissed in the private sector, which is
denoted by δp per period. Figure 1 illustrates the diﬀerent ﬂows in the labor
market.
The number of job matches taking place per unit of time is given by
M(v, U + S), with v is the number of vacant jobs in the emerging sector.1
This is assumed increasing in both its arguments, concave and homogeneous
of degree 1. The rate at which vacant jobs become ﬁlled is writtenm(θ) where
θ = v
U+S is the labor market tightness.
2 The properties of the matching
technology implies m′(θ) < 0. Job seekers move into private employment at
rate θm(θ) with dθm(θ)
dθ
> 0.3 Then the dynamic Bellman equations for the
1As the total labour force is normalized to 1, v is also the vacancy rate and U the
unemployment rate
2The probability of filling a vacancy per unit of time is M(v,U+S)
v
= M(1, U + S/v) ≡
m(θ)
3The probability of finding a private job for a job-seeker per unit of time is M(v,U+S)
U+S
=
M(v/U+S, 1) ≡ θm(θ). Unlike Tichit (2006), this probability is endogenous which is more
state workers, the unemployed and the private workers are given respectively
by:
rVs = ws + δs(Vu − Vs) + θm(θ)(Vp − Vs) + V˙s (1)
rVu = b+ θm(θ)(Vp − Vu) + V˙u (2)
rVp = wp + δp(Vu − Vp) + V˙p (3)
where wi (for i = s, p) is the wage in the state and private sectors,
respectively, δi is the exogenous job-loss rate in the sector i, r the discount
rate and b the unemployment beneﬁts. We assume that b < ws and we have
Vu ≤ Vs and Vu ≤ Vp. V˙i is the expected capital gain from changes in the
net worth of a worker or a job-seeker during adjustment.
Let again Πj (j = s, p) denote the asset value of a ﬁlled job (in the old
sector and in the new one) and Πv the asset value of a vacant job in the
private sector.4 They are given by:
rΠs = ys − ws − δsΠs + Π˙s (4)
rΠp = yp − wp + δp(Πv −Πp) + Π˙p (5)
rΠv = −h+m(θ)(Πp −Πv) + Π˙v (6)
where yj is the productivity in sector j, h the vacant job cost per unit
time.
The evolution of mean unemployment, public employment and private
employment are given by:
U˙ = δsS + δpP − θm(θ)U (7)
S˙ = −(δs + θm(θ))S (8)
P˙ = θm(θ)(U + S)− δpP (9)
We assume that the labor force is constant and normalized to 1. The
transition process takes place over time. At the beginning of transition, all
the labor force is in the state sector S, there is no unemployment and the
private sector does not exist. At the end of the transition, the state sector
has disappeared, which implies S = 0 and U + P = 1.
Job creation takes place when a ﬁrm and a worker meet and agree to an
employment contract. All proﬁt opportunities from new jobs are exploited,
driving rents from vacant jobs to zero (free entry condition). This implies
Πv = Π˙v = 0. Therefore equation (6) implies Πp = h/m(θ). Substituting
into (5), we obtain:
h
m(θ)
=
y − wp + Π˙p
r + δp
(10)
realistic
4There is no vacant job in the old declining sector and the wage ws is considered as
exogenous
Diﬀerentiating equation (10) gives the out-of-steady-state dynamics of
labor-market tightness:
−
hm′(θ)(
m(θ)
)2 θ˙ = Π˙p (11)
A realized job match yields some pure economic rent. Wages need to
share this economic rent (in addition to compensating each side for its costs
of creating the job). At the beginning of transition, all the labor force is
employed in the old sector (S = 1 and U = P = 0). We assume that ﬁrms in
the private sector set the wage such that Vp = Vs in order to attract workers
from the state sector. As Vu ≤ Vp (and Vu ≤ Vs), being employed in the
private sector is always better for unemployed workers. With equations (1)
and (3), we obtain:
Vp − Vu =
wp − ws
δp − δs
(12)
Note that the condition Vp − Vu ≥ 0 is satisﬁed if and only if:
• δs < δp and wp ≥ ws
• or δs > δp and ws ≥ wp
If δs < δp, the risk of unemployment is higher in the private sector than
in the old sector. Private ﬁrms have to compensate for this risk by oﬀering
higher wages than in the public sector. On the contrary, when δs > δp the
old sector is riskier, and so, state workers are willing to accept a lower wage
to work in the less risky private sector. Therefore private ﬁrms can oﬀer
wp < ws.
Diﬀerentiating equation (12) gives:
w˙p = (δp − δs)(V˙p − V˙u) (13)
Combining equations (2) and (3) and substituting into (13) gives the
out-of-steady-state dynamic of private wages:
w˙p =
(
r + δs + θm(θ)
)
wp −
(
r + δp + θm(θ)
)
ws + (δp − δs)b (14)
For given public wages and unemployment beneﬁts, the out-of-steady-
state dynamics of wages (equation (14)) is entirely driven by the dynamics
of labor-market tightness (equation (11)).
3 Steady-state equilibrium
We now study the end of the transition process which is given by the steady-
state equilibrium (with S = 0 and U + P = 1). The end of transition
is deﬁned by the triple (U ,θ,w) that satisﬁes the ﬂow condition (7), the
dynamic job-creation condition (11) and the dynamic wage equation (14) at
the steady state equilibrium. We ﬁrst determine the ratio of vacancies to
job-seekers and the private wage. From (11), a ﬁrst relationship is obtained
between θ and wp when (θ˙ = 0), which we write as wLDp (θ) and is given by:
h
m(θ)
=
y − wp
r + δp
(15)
wLDp (θ) (which is the labor demand equation) has the following properties
(see proof in appendix):
dwLDp
dθ
< 0, lim
θ→0
wLDp = y, lim
wLDp →0
θ = m−1
[h(r + p)
y
]
≡ θmax
Equation (15) deﬁnes a monotonic decreasing relation between wp and θ.
Indeed, higher private wages make job creation less proﬁtable, and so lead
to a lower equilibrium ratio of jobs to workers.
From equation (14), a second relationship is obtained between θ and wp
when (w˙p = 0), which we denote by wWDp (θ):
wp = ws +
(δp − δs)(ws − b)
r + s+ θm(θ)
(16)
with the following properties:
• if δs > δp
dwWDp
dθ
> 0,
lim
θ→0
wWDp = ws +
(δp − δs)(ws − b)
r + δs
≡ xA,
lim
θ→∞
wWDp = ws
• if δs < δp
dwWDp
dθ
< 0,
lim
θ→0
wWDp = ws +
(δp − δs)(ws − b)
r + δs
≡ xB ,
lim
θ→∞
wWDp = ws
We easily obtain that 0 < xA < ws < xB and ws < y. If δs > δp, the
wage curve wWDp deﬁned by equation (16) is an increasing function with
θ. This is a situation where the state sector is riskier (the job-loss rate in
the state sector is higher than in the private sector). The higher ratio of
vacancies to unemployment increases the probability of ﬁnding a job for all
job seekers (unemployed and state workers). This increases the asset value
of an unemployed (Vu) or a state worker (Vs) which increases the private
wage required to attract state workers. On the contrary, if δs < δp, the wage
curve wWDp is a decreasing function with θ. In this case, the private sector
is riskier and ﬁrms must pay a higher wage to attract state employees. But
if the exit rate from unemployment or the state sector to the private sector
increases (through an increase in θ), the private wage required to attract
state workers decreases. Being in the riskier sector is compensated by an
increase in θ.
Steady-state equilibrium values of θ and wp are at the intersection of these
two functions (labor demand equation wLDp (15) and wage determination
condition wWDp (16)). Figure 2 describes these two curves in the plane
(θ,wp). There are two distinct cases. First, it is easy to see that when
δs > δp, there exists a unique equilibrium E∗A that gives a unique value of θ
and a unique value of wp that we write (θ∗A, w
∗
pA). Secondly when δs < δp, the
equilibrium is deﬁned by two monotonic decreasing functions. Since these
two functions have not the same slope and are not parallel, this equilibrium
is unique if xB < y. Now if xB > y, there may be one or two equilibria given
the convexity of wWDp (θ). For the chosen calibration in the next section,
there are two equilibria. We denote the ﬁrst steady-state equilibrium by E∗B
with (θ∗B , w
∗
pB). The other equilibrium denoted by E
∗
C in the ﬁgure has a
value of θ which is near to 0. In this particular case, we will next show that
the unemployment rate is equal to 1. This is a corner solution where all the
workers are unemployed and the private sector does not emerge.
The comparison of these two cases ( δs > δp versus δs < δp is informa-
tive. Given the value of δs in comparison to δp, the transition process does
not end up at the same equilibrium. As a result, it seems that the way
of restructuring the public sector plays a prominent role in the process of
transition.
Proposition 1 At the beginning of the transition, countries face two types
of strategy
• Strategy A: reduce public employment such as δs > δp
• Strategy B: keep public employment high enough such as δs < δp
According to the wage determination rule (Vp = Vs), we know that if
there are massive layoﬀs in the state sector (δs > δp), the private sector wage
required to attract workers has to be lower than the public one. This should
Figure 2: Equilibrium wages and market tightness
be true throughout the transition process. This implies that wpA∗ < ws
is also satisﬁed at the end of the transition. On the contrary, when state
employment is kept high (δs < δp), the private sector wage required to attract
workers has to be higher than the public one. Again, this condition is also
satisﬁed at the end of transition, w∗pB > ws. Then, this implies that
w∗pA < w
∗
pB (17)
Furthermore, using equation (15), we obtain:
h
m(θ∗A)
>
h
m(θ∗B)
⇔ θ∗A > θ
∗
B
Finally, plugging the equilibrium value of ratio of vacancies to unem-
ployment (θ∗A or θ
∗
B) in equation (7) determines steady-state unemployment
at the end of the transition process (when U˙ = P˙ = S˙ = 0, S = 0 and
P + U = 1):
Ui =
δp
δp + θ
∗
im(θ
∗
i )
for i = A,B (18)
Again given the value of δs, there are two steady-state equilibria of unem-
ployment that we write as U∗A when δs > δp and U
∗
B when δs < δp. It is
easily veriﬁed that since θ∗A > θ
∗
B, we get U
∗
A < U
∗
B .
5 Figure 3 illustrates
this point in the job-seekers - vacancy space. Since θ∗i is independant of
unemployment, it is shown as a line through the origin, with slope θ∗i . At
the end of the transition we know that S = 0, the steady-state condition
for unemployment is the Beveridge curve and it is convex to the origin by
the properties of the matching function. When there are more vacancies,
unemployment is lower because the unemployed ﬁnd jobs more easily. We
denote by E∗A the steady-state equilibrium when δs > δp and by E
∗
B when
δs < δp.
Proposition 2 The comparison of the two strategies implies:
w∗pA < w
∗
pB, θ
∗
A > θ
∗
B, and U
∗
A < U
∗
B
where A represents the strategy δs > δp and B the strategy δs < δp
The thinking behind this result is quite simple. We know that part of
the wages are a kind of premium to compensate the risk of being ﬁred. The
required wage to attract workers is lower in the case A where the private
sector is less risky. In this case, job creation is more proﬁtable and private
ﬁrms create more vacancies than in case B (v∗A > v
∗
B). This leads to a higher
equilibrium ratio of jobs to workers in A than in B (θ∗A > θ
∗
B). This means
that there are more jobs relative to job seekers in case A (or in other words,
the rate at which job seekers move into employment is higher in case A).
As a result, unemployment is lower when there are massive layoﬀs in the
state sector (when state layoﬀs are greater than private layoﬀs). Strategy
A characterized by a big destruction of public jobs implies in the end low
unemployment. Whereas strategy B characterized by a small destruction of
public jobs leads to higher unemployment.
4 The transition process
4.1 Out-of-steady-state dynamics
Our focus here is on the dynamic behaviour of unemployment and vacancies.
Before the transition, the economy must be at point E0 in ﬁgure 3 where
S = 1 and U = 0. All workers are employed in the state sector. At the
beginning of the transition the state sector ’chooses’ to lay oﬀ a part of
its workers. This implies a decrease in state employment at a rate δs per
period, and this creates a labor force pool for the emergent private sector.
Both wages and market tightness jump to their equilibrium values. There
are no adjustment dynamics for these two jump variables. So, the saddle
5Note also that limθ→0 U = 1. Then the equilibrium E
∗
C in figure 2 describes a situation
where the transition does not take place
Figure 3: Adjustments in vacancy - job seekers space
path is θ-stationary; this is the line through the origin in the vacancy - job
seekers space. Initially equilibrium jumps from E0 to E′A when δs > δp or
E′B when δs < δp. Then, adjustment takes place along the saddle-path with
θ constant. Since market tightness has jumped to its equilibrium value θ∗i
with i = A,B, the dynamics of job-seekers is completely deﬁned by:
U˙ + S˙ = −(δp + θ
∗
im(θ
∗
i ))(U + S) + δp (19)
Since ﬁrms open up more vacancies at the beginning of the adjustment than
the number they expect to have in equilibrium, there is an overshooting
of vacancies which moves the economy down the job creation path towards
steady-state equilibrium E∗A or E
∗
B . During adjustment the number of va-
cancies falls through the matching process and the number of job-seekers
increases (because of an increase in unemployment and a decrease in state
employment) so as to maintain the θ ratio constant. Figure 3 illustrates these
adjustments. Let us now compare the two cases. If δs is low, there are not
enough workers available for the private sector, not enough unemployment
to develop a private sector, as in Aghion & Blanchard (1994). Private ﬁrms
do not create enough vacancies, so market tightness is too low (Note that if
θ is too low, there can be no equilibrium as shown at point E∗C in ﬁgure 3).
The higher θ is, the higher the pool of labor force is for the private sector.
This stimulates ﬁrms to open more vacancies. This eﬀect is strengthened
when δs > δp. The required wage to attract state workers decreases which
increases the expected proﬁt on a ﬁlled job. Therefore the overshooting of
vacancies seem to be higher in case A. What can we say about the dynamics
of unemployment? Using U + P + S = 1 and (7), we obtain:
U˙ = (δs − δp)S − (δp + θm(θ))U + δp (20)
Thus, dynamics of unemployment is aﬀected by three eﬀects: ﬁrst, the way
of reallocating public employment during transition (δs − δp)S, second job
creation in the private sector (δp + θm(θ))U , and third the importance of
job losses in the private sector δp. Unambiguously, more job creation in
the private sector tends to decrease unemployment, all things being equal.
Whereas more job losses in this sector, all things being equal, tends to in-
crease unemployment. However, the impact of the restructuring of public
employment on unemployment is ambiguous. This restructuring tends to
decrease unemployment if δs is lower than δp (strategy B), but to increase
unemployment in the opposite case. At the very beginning of the transition
(S = 1), this restructuring eﬀect overcomes the two others. Thus, when
δs < δp few workers are laid oﬀ. And they are hired by private ﬁrms. Con-
sequently unemployment is expected to increase slowly and continuously in
the countries which have adopted the strategy B. On the contrary, when
δs > δp, the private sector can not absorb all the dismissed state workers.
Unemployment is expected to jump in the ﬁrst years of transition for the
countries that have adopted strategy A, and then to decrease toward its
steady-state value.
4.2 The length of transition
We now calibrate the model in order to provide an estimate of the length
of the transition process. Oﬃcial statistics being rare, the parameters of
the model are set in the most plausible way relative to others calibrated
matching models (see Table 1 for a summary). The unit of time is 1 year.
The productivity parameter is set at 0.9. The matching function is a Cobb-
Douglas with m(θ) = M0θ−γ. The elasticity of the matching function γ is
set at 0.5, which is quite standard, and M0 at 0.2, which is lower than in a
market economy (but at the beginning of the transition, we can assume that
the matching process is not very eﬃcient). The interest rate is set at the
usual value of 5 per cent. The cost of a vacancy h is 0.3. Public wages are set
at 0.7. Unemployment beneﬁts are set at 0.5 which represents a replacement
ratio of 70 per cent of the public wage. The job loss rate in the private
sector is set at 0.1, which represents a typical measure of gross job losses per
year in a market economy. The job loss rate in the state sector is the only
parameter which distinguishes between the two strategies. We consider that
δs is equal to 0.2 in case A, whereas it is equal to 0.03 in case B.
Table 1: Baseline parameters value
Parameters Symbol Value
Productivity y 0.9
Cost of posting a vacancy h 0.3
Eﬃciency of the matching function M0 0.2
Elasticity of the matching function γ 0.5
Unemployment beneﬁts b 0.5
Public wage ws 0.7
Interest rate r 0.05
Job loss rate in the private sector δp 0.1
Job loss rate in the public sector δs 0.2 strategy A
0.03 strategy B
Table 2: Implied steady-state values
Variables Symbol Value
Labor market tightness with strategy A θ∗A 2.53
Labor market tightness with strategy B θ∗B 0.77
Private wage with strategy A w∗pA 0.66
Private wage with strategy B w∗pB 0.77
Unemployment rate with strategy A U∗A 0.23
Unemployment rate with strategy B U∗B 0.37
Length of transition in strategy A 17 years
Length of transition in strategy B 36 years
Using this set of parameters, we can compute the implied steady-state
values of the model (see Table 2). Strategy A is associated with a higher labor
market tightness with more job creations than strategy B. As a result the
unemployment rate is lower in countries that have adopted the big reduction
of public employment strategy. Furthermore, the transition process is shorter
in case A, 17 years versus 36 years in strategy B.
The dynamics of unemployment in the two cases are illustrated in ﬁgure
4. Countries that have adopted Strategy A suﬀer from an overshooting of
unemployment in the ﬁrst years of the transition process. This is due to
the high losses in state employment. There are not enough job creations in
the private sector to hire all the dismissed state workers, but this creates
a labor force pool for the emergence of the private sector. Job creations
become proﬁtable for ﬁrms because the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy in-
creases. Subsequently the growth of the private sector leads to a decrease
in unemployment, 5 years after the beginning of the transition. In strategy
B, there are not ’enough’ unemployed workers. The probability of ﬁlling
a vacancy is too low which makes job creation less proﬁtable. As a re-
sult, the unemployment rate increases continuously, and the private sector
does not really emerge. As the destruction of the state sector is slower, the
transition process lasts longer. These predictions are similar to the paths
experienced by the transition countries. At the beginning of the transition,
all post-communist countries had similar macroeconomic problems, espe-
cially as regards the emergence of unemployment. However, in Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) the oﬃcial unemployment rate grew
quickly at the very beginning of the transition while it increases slowly in
the Former Soviet Unions (FSUs). The dynamics generated by Strategy A
may describe accurately the transition observed in most of the CEECs (in
particular Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Albania). In-
deed, in this region the state-owned entreprises generally adjusted by a cut
in employment rather than in salary (see Basu et al. 2000, Boeri & Terrell
2002). Unemployment thus has grown up very quickly, but at the same time
the new private sector has developed substantially. The evolution gener-
ated with Strategy B may correspond to the transition observed in most of
the FSUs, in particular in Belarus, Kazakstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The oﬃcial unemployment was very low in these
countries at the beginning of transition, but the development of the private
sector is stagnant. The statistics show that the economic revival only be-
gan with the increase in oﬃcial unemployment, after 6-7 years of transition
(EBRD 2009). Indeed, it has been established by numerous authors (see Fo-
ley 1997, Broadman & Recanatini 2001) that in the FSUs, the state-owned
enterprises adjusted to the output contraction more by a cut in wages and
hours worked than by layoﬀs. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider that
in the FSUs, the dismissal probability was very low in the public sector in
the short term. What the model predicts in this case is a small change in
the oﬃcial unemployment rate, coupled with a limited development of the
private sector. This may explain why the FSUs countries experienced peri-
ods of negative growth with low unemployment rates. Moreover, since the
end of the 1990s, unemployment has tended to increase, but the take-oﬀ of
the private sector is far from certain. These countries seem to be trapped in
a vicious circle, leading - in the long term - to a low development of a formal
private sector. Obviously, the oﬃcial unemployment will probably not reach
very high double digit levels. As already highlighted in the introduction, a
lot of former public workers leave their jobs voluntarily or are involved in the
unoﬃcial sector, especially in the FSUs countries. Part of the simulated evo-
lution of the oﬃcial unemployment rate in the model will in fact be shadow
employment.
Figure 4: The dynamics of unemployment
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose a theoretical analysis of labor reallocation in tran-
sition countries. Using a dynamic matching model we ﬁnd evidence that
the choice oof the initial strategy used by state-owned enterprises for reduc-
ing their labor forces can have dramatic consequences on the transformation
process. We solve our model analytically and numerically. The analytical
solutions lead us to consider two diﬀerent strategies. In Strategy A, public
enterprises decide to reduce their labor forces quite quickly. According to
our results and simulations, with this strategy the transition is achieved in
17 years. There is an overshooting of unemployment in the ﬁrst years of
the transition and the unemployment at the end of transition is around 23
percent. On the other hand, when public enterprises opt to reduce their la-
bor force more gradually, the transition lasts longer (about 36 years) and is
characterized by a higher unemployment rate (37 percent) at the end of the
transformation. Hence our model has some policy implications. Whenever
a government plans to destroy a whole sector of the economy in order to
achieve a systemic transformation, it should not do it too slowly, as it could
be more costly in terms of unemployment and activity in the long run. Of
course we are aware that this conclusion does not take into account the social
consequences of the reform, nor the question of ﬁnancing the unemployment
beneﬁts. Nevertheless, we think that our work contributes to a better under-
standing of the economic evolution after a major structural reform. In this
simple model we consider that the state workers who can’t ﬁnd a job in the
formal new private sector are oﬃcially unemployed. Of course, in practice,
they will partly move into the informal sector, so that the oﬃcial unemploy-
ment rate will never reach very high double digit levels. A full explanation
of the importance of the informal sector needs further research. We intend
to adapt Boeri & Garibaldi (2007) to our framework. Although we are aware
that this extension will signiﬁcantly increase the complexity of the model,
we think that this could help to understand further the diverging evolutions
of the labor markets in the diﬀerent transition countries.
Appendix
Labor demand
−hm′(θ)[m(θ)]2
dθ
dwp
= −
1
r + δp
(21)
As m′(θ) is decreasing, we have dθ
dwp
< 0. The labor demand is a mono-
tonic decreasing relation d
2θ
dw2p
= 0
Wage curve
dwp
dθ
= −[m(θ) + θm′(θ)](δp − δs)(ws − b)[r + δs + θm(θ)]
−2 (22)
We obtain that dwp
dθ
> 0 if δs > δp whereas
dwp
dθ
< 0 if δs < δp
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